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Introduction
In 2002, CARICOM1 member states voted unanimously in 
support of the Organization of American States’ (OAS) 
Resolution 833, to recognize Hugo Chavez as the democrati-
cally elected government of the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela. However, the united support they showed for the 
OAS’s stance for democracy crumbled when, between 2017 
and 2019, they were expected to vote on four resolutions 
(failed U.S.-backed resolution on June 21, 2017; AG/RES. 
2929; XLVIII-O/18 CP/RES. 1117 (2200/19); CP/RES. 1124 
(2217/19) on the political and humanitarian crisis in 
Venezuela. Instead of unanimous support for Venezuela, 
CARICOM member states were divided, voting within three 
predominant blocs: pro-Venezuela, pro-United States, and 
abstention. It is important to examine this division as the 
positions taken by individual member states appears to be 
directly influenced by lucrative energy and investment deals 
received from both Venezuela and the United States between 
2005 and 2019. Moreover, this emerging voting pattern is 
contrary to the traditional neoliberal institutionalist principle 
of mutual cooperation which guides the operations and func-
tions of the OAS.
Neoliberal institutionalism posits that the anarchic nature 
of the international system means that states are faced with 
the scenario of a prisoner’s dilemma (Grieco, 1988). The 
prisoner’s dilemma refers to a game where states are more 
inclined to defect irrespective of whether or not the other 
state chooses to cooperate or defect. The dilemma arises 
because both states would be worse off from defecting than 
from mutual cooperation. However, international institutions 
such as the OAS reduces the complexity of the prisoner’s 
dilemma as it provides the opportunity for states to negotiate 
their conflicts, find mutual interest, build trust, and form 
mutually beneficial agreements (Keohane & Martin, 1995; 
Nye & Welch, 2013; Waltz, 1997, 2000). Since 1948, the 
operations of the OAS have been primarily informed by neo-
liberal institutionalism and the organization has generally 
reflected institutional cooperation in its facilitation of the 
shared interests of member states: its repulsion of Soviet 
interests in the Americas, the exclusion of Cuba from the 
OAS because of its socialist communist regime, the restora-
tion of democratic regime in Dominican Republic in 1960, 
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the reinstatement of Haitian President Aristide in 1994, and 
the adaptation of the Inter-American Democratic Charter 
(IADC) in 2001 (Herz, 2008; Shaw, 2004). Evidently, neo-
liberal institutionalism can explain CARICOM states’ unani-
mous vote for Resolution 833 in 2002 to restore democracy 
in Venezuela. However, neoliberal Institutionalism fell short 
in explaining the recent inability of CARICOM member 
states to find mutual grounds on the political and humanitar-
ian crisis in Venezuela. This is the gap that the neorealism 
framework adopted in this article seeks to address.
CARICOM’s division in their support for Venezuela can 
be quite aptly explained through the neorealism framework. 
Neorealism embraces the view that the international system is 
anarchic, and so this framework is quite applicable in the case 
of CARICOM where cooperation has become difficult. For 
neorealists, cooperation under anarchy is challenging because 
(a) states are rational actors, and (b) where states do cooperate 
within international institutions, it is a manifestation of the 
hegemon’s self-interest (Mearsheimer, 1994-1995; Waltz, 
2000). These two tenets of neorealism provide a framework 
to examine two issues: United States’ and Venezuela’s 
attempts to dominate the agenda of the OAS and the implica-
tions of their behavior on CARICOM members’ voting pat-
tern. In this article, I make two claims, namely, the investments 
by both the United States and Venezuela in selective 
CARICOM countries qualify as an attempt to influence the 
OAS decision-making mechanism, and that these invest-
ments have served as incentives for CARICOM beneficiaries 
to exercise rationality, that is, to prioritize their national inter-
ests and therefore vote in favor of the donating country within 
the OAS. To develop this argument, this article is divided into 
three sections. Section “Background” provides a background 
outlining the intersection of the United States’ and Venezuela’s 
national interests in the OAS. Section “United States’ and 
Venezuela’s Response to CARICOM’s Energy Inefficiency” 
discusses the strategies used by both the United States and 
Venezuela to solicit the support of CARICOM member states 
for their respective interests in the OAS. Section “CARICOM’s 
Rationality Toward United States and Venezuela” examines 
the apparent correlation between CARICOM’s voting pattern 
in the OAS and investments received from Venezuela and the 
United States.
Background
As illustrated in Table 1, between 2017 and 2019, CARICOM 
member states have been divided in their support for OAS 
resolutions on the political and humanitarian crisis in 
Venezuela. On June 19, 2017, the U.S.-backed resolution 
calling for mediation on the Venezuelan political crisis and 
President Maduro’s reconsideration of his intention to rewrite 
the Venezuelan constitution fell short by three votes in the 
OAS (“Jamaica Supported Failed US-Backed Resolution on 
Venezuela,” 2017). In June 2018, Resolution 2929 declared 
that the May 28, 2018 general election in Venezuela was 
undemocratic as it did not meet international standards. 
Resolution 2929 called on Venezuelan authorities to call fresh 
democratic elections (OAS, 2018). In January 2019, 
Resolution 1117 called on member states “to not recognize 
the legitimacy of Nicolás Maduro’s new term as of the 10th of 
January of 2019” (OAS, 2019c, para. 12). Furthermore, in 
April 2019, Resolution 1124 called on member states “to 
accept the appointment of Mr. Gustavo Tarre as the National 
Assembly’s designated Permanent Representative, pending 
Table 1. CARICOM Member States Voting Pattern on Selected OAS Resolution Between 2002 and 2019.
Country CP/RES. 833 (1349/02) U.S.-backed failed RES.
AG/RES. 2929 
(XLVIII-O/18)
CP/RES. 1117 
(2200/19)
CP/RES. 1124 
(2217/19)
Trinidad and Tobago Favor Abstain Abstain Abstain Abstain
Antigua and Barbuda Favor Abstain Abstain Abstain Against
Suriname Favor Abstain Abstain Against Against
St. Kitts and Nevis Favor Against Abstain Abstain Abstain
Dominica Favor Against Against Against Against
St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines
Favor Against Against Against Against
Grenada Favor Favor Abstain Absent Against
Haiti Favor Against Abstain Favor Favor
Belize Favor Favor Favor Abstain Absent
Barbados Favor Favor Favor Abstain Abstain
Guyana Favor Favor Favor Favor Abstain
Bahamas Favor Favor Favor Favor Favor
Jamaica Favor Favor Favor Favor Favor
St. Lucia Favor Favor Favor Favor Favor
Note. Data for CP/RES. 833 (1349/02) from OAS (2002); for U.S.-backed failed RES. from “Jamaica Supported Failed US-Backed Resolution on Venezuela” 
(2017); for AG/RES. 2929 (XLVIII-O/18) from “Jamaica Supports Suspending Venezuela From OAS” (2018); for CP/RES. 1117 (2200/19) from U.S. Mission 
to the OAS (2019); for CP/RES. 1124 (2217/19) from OAS (2019a). OAS = Organization of American States.
Johnson 3
new elections and the appointment of a democratically elected 
government” (OAS, 2019b, para. 1). In light of these resolu-
tions, the guiding questions for the next section are as fol-
lows: What was the underlying rationale for the introduction 
of the failed resolution by the United States? Also, what could 
have caused a division within a bloc of states (CARICOM) 
that have traditionally voted together in international organi-
zations on issues affecting their foreign policy?
Perhaps, the root cause of the division among CARICOM 
members over Resolutions 2929, 1117, and 1124 can be 
traced back to Resolution 833, passed in 2002 (OAS, 2002). 
In April 2002, the democratically elected government of the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela was temporarily removed 
by a coup d’état, led by the military and special interest 
business groups (Cooper & Legler, 2006; Melean, 2003; 
Olivari, 2014). In response to this, the OAS secretariat 
invoked the 2001 IADC of the OAS which requires member 
states to adhere to the fundamental principles of democracy 
by virtue of the preservation and elimination of threats to 
democracy (Heine & Weiffen, 2015; Perina, n.d.). More 
specifically, the Secretary General drafted and tendered 
Resolution 833, which called for the rejection of the coup 
d’état, a reaffirmation for the support and recognition of the 
Hugo Chavez’s government, dialogue between the govern-
ment and opposition, the acknowledgment of the right of the 
Venezuelan people to elect their government officials, and 
respect for human rights and freedom of expression (Heine 
& Weiffen, 2015).
It should be noted that inasmuch as Resolution 833 was 
unanimously passed and in less than 48 hr, the Chavez 
administration was reinstated as the official government of 
the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela; the United States did 
not initially condemn the coup d’état (Marcano, Tyszka, & 
Cordero, 2007; OAS, 2002). The United States’ action lead-
ing up to the passing of Resolution 833 depicted a rational 
state driven by its national interests. There is evidence to 
suggest that the United States sponsored the opposition and 
its then leader—Pedro Carmona (Lusane, 2006). However, 
the United States eventually reversed its opposition to the 
Hugo Chavez–led government after failing to garner the sup-
port of key allies. The other 34 OAS members’ belief in the 
preservation of the IADC informed their decision to put their 
reservations about the Chavez regime aside and to vote for 
Resolution 833 (Melean, 2003; Olivari, 2014; Ramis, 2010).
Chavez’s Rise and Its Implications for 
United States’ Interest in Venezuela
The United States’ hostility toward Venezuela coincides with 
Hugo Chavez’s ascendancy to the presidency. For years, the 
United States depended on Venezuela for oil imports. The 
asymmetrical oil trading relationship between the two coun-
tries extends to 1914, after the discovery of oil. Using con-
cessions, Venezuela invited foreign companies to invest in its 
extraction and the United States’ interests in Venezuelan oil 
remained steady until Chavez’s ascendancy to power in 1999 
(Dao & Banerjee, 2003; Uk-Heon, 2010).
While on the campaign trail in 1998, Chavez continu-
ously lamented that contrary to widespread reports, 
“Petróleos de Venezuela” (PDVSA) was never truly nation-
alized in 1976—a situation he vowed to rectify when he took 
office (Dao & Banerjee, 2003; Uk-Heon, 2010). The PDVSA 
was founded as a national company in 1976 and since then it 
had undergone several structural changes leading up to 1999. 
Between 1976 and 1982, the company was nationalized by 
the government. However, a second structural change was 
performed between 1983 and 1988 to convert PDVSA into a 
firm. This move also provided the company with greater 
autonomy by handing over power to elite technocrats and 
consequently limiting the power of the government 
(Uk-Heon, 2010). The fourth and final change took place 
between 1989 and 1998, where stakes within PDVSA were 
made available to foreign companies for purchase. Chavez’s 
goal of truly nationalizing the oil company threatened the 
elite technocrats and foreign firms (U.S. companies 
included), which controlled stakes in PDVSA, and its sub-
sidiary companies (Dao & Banerjee, 2003; Uk-Heon, 2010).
Chavez’s first major task as leader of government was to 
wrestle the domestic share of PDVSA from the elite techno-
crats, resulting in his temporary removal from office (Hults, 
2007). As previously mentioned, the PDVSA was restruc-
tured in 1983 to allow for greater independence from both 
state and foreign control (Coronel, 1984; Dick, 2005; Hults, 
2007; Kozloff, 2007; Uk-Heon, 2010). The vision of an 
autonomous PDVSA and the premise that the company could 
only succeed if it functioned as an independent entity shaped 
the company’s strategy from 1983 through to 1998. The 
PDVSA, in its function as a private company, was diametri-
cally opposed to government control (Hults, 2007; Kozloff, 
2007). Notwithstanding this, the PDVSA’s management 
introduced the apertura strategy which opened PDVSA to 
partner with international oil companies (IOC; Hults, 2007; 
Uk-Heon, 2010). The underlying rationale was that the 
Venezuelan economy stood to benefit from increased reve-
nue generated from oil sales, technology transfer, foreign 
investment and expansion of the oil sector (Dick, 2005; 
Hults, 2007).
However, PDVSA’s strategy of independent management 
was diametrically opposed to Chavez’s left-wing view that 
government should control Venezuelan oil (Hults, 2007). 
Chavez’s primary argument was that the independent man-
agement style of PDVSA was depriving his government of 
tax revenues and royalties as well as significant funding for 
the government planned social revolution. It is noteworthy 
that PDVSA contributed to 50% of the government’s gross 
domestic product (GDP) for decades (Uk-Heon, 2010; Yergin 
& Petkoff, 2011). This conflict in vision over the manage-
ment of Venezuelan oil led to friction between technocrats 
and the government, which gradually erupted in violence in 
2002. Chavez’s increasing demands on the independent 
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management of PDVSA led to a strike by technocrats. The 
strike resulted in a drop in production, which spiraled into a 
national protest and eventual retaliation from anti-Chavez 
protestors. Chavez was temporarily ousted by a coup d’état 
and reinstated in less than 48 hr. Immediately upon returning 
to office, Chavez retaliated by firing 18,000 employees from 
the PDVSA and replaced them with persons loyal to the 
Bolivarian socialist revolution (Hults, 2007; “Oil’s Dark 
Secret,” 2006).
At the time of Chavez’s ousting in 2002, U.S. oil compa-
nies controlled significant stakes in PDVSA; for example, 
within the Orinoco Belt, Conoco U.S. had a 50/50 partner-
ship with PDVSA in Petrozuata; Phillips U.S. (30%) and 
Texaco U.S. (40%) controlled a combined 70% stake in 
Hamaca (Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean [ECLAC], 2001). Therefore, the evidence clearly 
demonstrates that Chavez’s 2001 proclamation that the for-
eign companies should only possess minority shares in 
PDVSA directly threatened United States’ interest, more spe-
cifically, its oil companies (Erkan, 2011). Moreover, in 2002, 
the United States’ energy security was in a crisis. The Bush 
administration was in the process of going to war with Iraq, 
and forecasts suggested that this would disrupt oil supply 
(Dao & Banerjee, 2003; Padgett, 2007). Furthermore, there 
were concerns that the United States’ prospective war with 
Iraq would cause increases in the price of oil. In fact, oil 
prices did increase from an average of US$25 per barrel to a 
high of US$40 (Dao & Banerjee, 2003; Looney, 2003). To 
circumvent the disruption in its oil supply from the Middle 
East, the United States planned to rely on oil supply from 
Venezuela (Dao & Banerjee, 2003). At the time, Venezuela 
accounted for 13% of United States’ oil imports (Gunson, 
2002). In the event that this failed to materialize, the United 
States would have to resort to its oil reserves—a last option 
(Dao & Banerjee, 2003).
In the next section, I outline how Chavez’s threat to 
United States’ energy security would go on to shape future 
relationships between OAS CARICOM members. After suc-
cessfully wrestling PDVSA from private management, 
Chavez formulated strategy to increase his political support 
in the Americas and realize his ambitions of establishing 
Venezuela as a regional hegemon, as well as having 
Venezuela elected as one of the United Nations (UN) secu-
rity council’s nonpermanent 10 members (Weintraub, Hester, 
& Prado, 2007; Wilpert, 2007). Given that these goals could 
hardly be realized without political capital from other states, 
Chavez took particular interest in CARICOM, whose 
15-member community represents a substantial voting bloc.
Gaining the future political support of CARICOM mem-
bers was always going to be a daunting task; over the years, 
Venezuela has had a fractured relationship with CARICOM 
members. For example, a number of CARICOM member 
states (Guyana, Antigua and Barbuda, St. Kitts-Nevis, 
Dominica, St. Lucia) were involved in maritime border dis-
putes with Venezuela in the 1980s (Sanders, 2015). Also, in 
the 1990s, Venezuela was among a group of Latin American 
countries which lobbied for the United States to petition the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) to rule that the preferential 
European Union (EU) market access for Caribbean bananas 
was illegal. The WTO ruling had adverse effects on the 
banana-exporting economies of St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, and Jamaica 
(Sanders, 2015). To repair the fractured relationship between 
Venezuela and CARICOM member states, Chavez targeted 
one of the greatest vulnerabilities of the already ailing econ-
omy of CARICOM countries—lack of energy security.
United States’ and Venezuela’s 
Response to CARICOM’s Energy 
Inefficiency
CARICOM member states have long suffered from lack of 
energy security. With the exception of the twin island 
Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, all other Caribbean coun-
tries are net importers of oil. For example, Figure 1 illus-
trates that in 2006, oil imports in the Latin America and 
Caribbean region accounted for 11% of GDP, whereas 
exports accounted for a mere 3% (Garcia Martinez & Poole, 
2004). The oil deficiency of these small countries renders 
them energy dependent and further increases their vulnera-
bility to oil price volatility (Garcia Martinez & Poole, 2004; 
Hall & Chuck-A-Sang, 2012). Fluctuating oil prices have 
one of the most significant effects on inflation in the 
CARICOM region, and this is evident in the positive correla-
tion between increases in oil prices and increases in the cost 
of transportation, consumption, and electricity (Cheasty, 
2016; International Monetary Fund [IMF], 2007a). Moreover, 
within the Caribbean, the average household energy cost 
amounts to 9% of GDP, compared with 2.5% in the United 
States (Hall & Chuck-A-Sang, 2012). These prices have neg-
ative macroeconomic effects, such as a constraint on house-
hold consumption, due to a significant reduction in household 
income. Given the dependence on oil imports, the govern-
ments of non-oil-producing CARICOM states have to sacri-
fice funds from other sectors of the economy to pay for 
increasing oil import bills. This consequently affects fiscal 
expenditure, drives up government spending, and eventually 
leads to a reduction in social spending (Garcia Martinez & 
Poole, 2004; Hall & Chuck-A-Sang, 2012).
To realize his ambitions of establishing Venezuela as a 
regional hegemon and addressing CARICOM’s energy defi-
ciency, Hugo Chavez initiated the PetroCaribe energy agree-
ment in 2005. Prior to 2005, CARICOM states, Jamaica in 
particular, consistently but unsuccessfully lobbied the United 
States for the financing of a liquefied natural gas (LNG) plant 
and the provision of LNG (“Jamaica and US Sign Energy 
Cooperation Agreement,” 2015). Whereas in the past 
CARICOM members had to finance their oil bill up front, 
under the PetroCaribe agreement, member states2 are afforded 
preferential payment terms. As highlighted in Table 2, the 
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higher the price of a barrel of oil, the lower the required down 
payment and the longer the time frame for payment 
(Goldwyn & Gill, 2016). What is particularly unique is that 
PetroCaribe members have the option of making term pay-
ment through cash, foods, and exchange of skilled personnel 
such as doctors and/or nurses (Haslam & Heidrich, 2016). 
Separate from oil imports, the PetroCaribe agreement by 
design has an investment portfolio. Proceeds from oil sales 
are invested domestically in member countries and serve as 
a concessionary loan for social development programs 
(Mendoza, 2016). Furthermore, the savings incurred from 
the long-term payment of oil is invested in a government 
fund used to finance critical infrastructure projects (IMF, 
2016; Mendoza, 2016).
Figure 1. Ratio of net oil imports or exports to GDP in Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries.
Source. Yépez García and Dana (2012, p. 3).a
Note. GDP = gross domestic product.
aRepublication of content is allowed subject to acknowledgment of the authors.
Table 2. PetroCaribe Credit Financing Scheme/Agreement.
Terms Cost per barrel
Member state percentage 
down payment Venezuelan financing
17-year loan term with 2% interest  
(2-year grace period)
≥US$15 per barrel 95 5
≥US$20 per barrel 90 10
≥US$22 per barrel 85 15
≥US$24 per barrel 80 20
≥US$30 per barrel 75 25
≥US$40 per barrel 70 30
25-year loan term with 2% interest  
(2-year grace period)
≥US$50 per barrel 60 40
≥US$80 per barrel 50 50
≥US$100 per barrel 40 60
≥US$150 per barrel 30 70
Source. Goldwyn and Gill (2016).
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Venezuela’s energy diplomacy in the CARICOM did not 
go unnoticed. The United States reasoned that since its launch 
in 2005, Venezuela’s PetroCaribe had created a state of oil 
dependency among beneficiaries within CARICOM. The 
United States anticipated that in all future OAS votes on 
issues affecting Venezuela, CARICOM states were bound to 
vote in favor of Venezuela. The United States realized this 
and devised a strategy to wean CARICOM members off 
Venezuelan oil or at least create a division in CARICOM sup-
port for Venezuela. The United States’ counter strategy came 
when the PetroCaribe was at a vulnerable stage. PetroCaribe, 
while it has helped its member states to purchase oil at a sig-
nificantly cheaper cost, began showing signs of vulnerability 
in 2013 (Schipani & Rathbone, 2015). First, the death of 
Hugo Chavez in 2013 raised significant doubt over his suc-
cessor Nicolás Maduro’s willingness to continue the agree-
ment (Goldwyn & Gill, 2014). Second, years of nationalizing 
the foreign stake in PDVSA resulted in a drastic reduction in 
foreign investment revenues in the sector, leaving it reeling 
from dated equipment, lack of technical personnel, and drill-
ing technology that undermined the sector’s sustainability 
(Padgett, 2007). Third, since Chavez’s takeover of the 
PDVSA, it has been used to bank-roll Chavez’s domestic 
(Bolivarian Social Revolution) and international political 
interests (PetroCaribe). However, the reduction of oil prices 
from US$114 per barrel to a low of US$35 sent shock waves 
through the Venezuelan economy, which has become over-
whelmingly dependent on oil for its GDP growth and export 
revenues (Kozloff, 2007). In 2012, oil imports from Venezuela 
were cut by 50% (Hidalgo, 2015). Fourth, many member 
states have not benefited from a reduction in electricity bills 
as savings from oil prices were used for budgetary support. 
Against these developments, there was an increasing need for 
CARICOM members, who were beneficiaries of PetroCaribe 
to find a more sustainable alternative source of renewable 
energy (Goldwyn & Gill, 2016).
In 2014, an assessment of energy security in Central 
America and the Caribbean revealed that the region was des-
perately in need of energy diversity. More specifically, 
investment in alternative energy to reduce nonproducing 
member states’ dependence on fossil fuels and reduce their 
vulnerability to fluctuating crude oil prices (Goldwyn & Gill, 
2014, 2016). The United States responded to the Caribbean’s 
long-standing vulnerability by launching the Caribbean 
Energy Security Initiative (CESI; U.S. Department of State, 
2014). This strategy was set in motion by the Obama admin-
istration in June 2014 at the first energy summit of the 
Americas hosted by the Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation (OPIC). The stakes were raised by the U.S. 
investors. Instead of competing with Venezuela by offering 
crude oil, the United States aligned its energy diplomacy 
with the needs of the Caribbean by offering diversified 
energy investment. OPIC provided investment to the 
Caribbean region in three main areas: LNG, wind and solar 
energy (Jamaica Information Service [JIS], 2015b). Since 
2014, this has resulted in US$107 million of investments in 
establishing solar plants as well as a US$90 million of invest-
ment in wind energy in Jamaica (Angus, 2015; Davis, 
2016a). Moreover, upon President Obama’s visit to Jamaica 
in April 2015, a bilateral agreement was signed between both 
countries for the United States to finance an LNG plant as 
well as supply LNG to Jamaica, which would be redistrib-
uted to other Caribbean countries (Davis, 2016b; Hines, 
2016). Since 2014, Jamaica is the largest solar energy facility 
in CARICOM, and the CARICOM member state receiving 
the largest amount of LNG investment from the United States 
(Davis, 2016a).
The launch of the CESI, the subsequent OPIC invest-
ments in alternative energy, as well as LNG investments in 
Jamaica threaten to significantly erode the political capital 
amassed by Venezuela among some PetroCaribe members 
who are a part of CARICOM. These developments caused a 
knee-jerk reaction, triggering Maduro to immediately hold 
talks with PetroCaribe states in 2015, to reassure his commit-
ment to sustaining the supply of crude oil under the 
PetroCaribe agreement (Parraga, 2015). Shortly after the 
OPIC investments and Maduro’s visit, Jamaica offered to 
purchase its PetroCaribe debt to Venezuela to lower its GDP 
debt ratio (JIS, 2015a). It can be argued convincingly that 
Jamaica’s act of purchasing its PetroCaribe debt was in direct 
response to OPIC investments.
Whereas the previous Bush and Obama administrations 
used subtle strategies to garner support for its agenda on 
Venezuela in the OAS, the present U.S. administration under 
the leadership of President Trump has been quite overt and 
indiscrete. In March 2019, President Trump invited four 
members of CARICOM, Bahamas, Haiti, Jamaica, and St. 
Lucia, to an extraordinary meeting and pledged to reward 
each country with investments from U.S. development lender, 
OPIC (OPIC, 2019; Rampton, 2019). The promise of reward 
would be in exchange for the states’ support for the United 
States’ interest in the OAS on the political and humanitarian 
crisis in Venezuela. All four countries have either failed to 
recognize Nicolás Maduro as the President of Venezuelan or 
backed Juan Guaido as leader of the Venezuelan National 
Assembly (“Venezuela in Crisis,” 2019).
CARICOM’s Rationality Toward  
United States and Venezuela
The series of events between 2002 and 2019 raises questions 
about the applicability of two key tenets of neorealism: (a) 
states are rational actors, and (b) where states do cooperate 
within international institutions, it is a manifestation of the 
hegemon’s self-interest (Mearsheimer, 1994-1995).
Evidence of rationality is traced back to the starting point 
of the energy quagmire Resolution 833 in 2002. The United 
States did not initially support Resolution 833 and was pre-
pared to compromise its stance on democratic principles 
preached over the years. To satisfy its own self-interest, the 
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United States was prepared to go against the collective view 
of the OAS on the IADC and acknowledge the 2002 coup 
d’état in Venezuela. The Bush administration would have 
preferred to recognize the coup, which would more than 
likely have satisfied United States’ interests. The United 
States’ self-interest in this case is identified as energy secu-
rity which was significantly undermined when Chavez 
nationalized the United States’ stakes in PDVSA. Chavez’s 
nationalization of United States’ stakes in the PDVSA could 
not have come at a more sensitive time. The impending 2003 
war in Iraq threatened to disrupt the U.S. oil supply from the 
golf region. These culminating events provided impetus for 
future U.S. hostility toward Venezuela.
Although the United States eventually supported the 
OAS’s resolution to reinstate the Chavez regime, automatic 
cooperation did not ensue. Instead, it triggered over a decade 
of competition between the main antagonists. Venezuela and 
the United States each launched separate strategic energy dip-
lomatic campaigns over the subsequent years to secure politi-
cal capital among CARICOM states. The antagonistic stance 
of the United States to the Chavez regime further transformed 
Venezuela into a creature of neorealism. Consequently, 
PetroCaribe by design was intended to serve Chavez’s ambi-
tion of elevating Venezuela to the position of a regional hege-
mon. It can also be argued that Chavez had hoped that by 
serving their energy need, CARICOM countries would vote 
in Venezuela’s favor in future issues affecting that country 
within organizations such as OAS and the UN.
To influence the votes of CARICOM members on OAS 
resolutions (relating to the political and humanitarian crisis 
in Venezuela) in its favor, the United States launched its own 
energy diplomacy: the CESI. This initiative strategically tar-
geted the energy needs of vulnerable CARICOM member 
states such as Bahamas, Haiti, Jamaica, and St. Lucia. As 
highlighted in Table 3, CARICOM member states voted 
unanimously for Resolution 833 in 2002. However, 
CARICOM votes on OAS Resolutions 2929, 1117, and 1124 
were split into three blocs: states that voted in “favor,” those 
that voted “against,” and the ones that “abstained.” The bloc 
which voted “against” was led by St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines and has been critical of fellow CARICOM mem-
ber states, Jamaica in particular, for not supporting Venezuela. 
The underlying claim is that Venezuela has been good to 
PetroCaribe members within CARICOM in the past and is in 
dire need of CARICOM’s support. When viewed through the 
lens of neorealism, Jamaica’s support of the OAS resolutions 
is a rational response to U.S. oil diplomacy. With the decline 
in oil prices and corresponding economic turmoil in 
Venezuela, the sustainable flow of crude oil imports to sat-
isfy Jamaica’s energy needs was threatened. Against the 
uncertainty of the PetroCaribe agreement, Jamaica’s energy 
interest was being catered for by the United States. The 
United States has strategically positioned Jamaica as the 
largest beneficiary of OPIC investment in clean energy in 
CARICOM and has yielded to one of Jamaica’s long-stand-
ing request by supplying the island with LNG. The U.S. 
investment in Jamaica’s energy sector has without a doubt 
surpassed the waning importance and growing uncertainty of 
PetroCaribe. Moreover, with Jamaica purchasing its 
PetroCaribe debt, the country was less obligated to cast its 
vote in support of Venezuela. Like Jamaica, other CARICOM 
member countries (particularly Bahamas, Haiti, and St. 
Lucia) stand to benefit from similar OPIC investment in the 
near future (OPIC, 2019).
Jamaica is not the only CARICOM state whose positions 
on the OAS resolutions were based on rationality. Other 
Table 3. CARICOM Member States’ Energy Status, PetroCaribe Membership, and Voting on OAS Resolutions.
Country
Petro Caribe 
membera Has oil
CP/RES. 833 
(1349/02)
U.S.-backed 
failed RES.
AG/RES. 2929 
(XLVIII-O/18)
CP/RES. 1117 
(2200/19
CP/RES. 1124 
(2217/19)
Trinidad and Tobago No Yes Favor Abstain Abstain Abstain Abstain
Antigua and Barbuda Yes No Favor Abstain Abstain Abstain Against
Suriname Yes Yes Favor Abstain Abstain Against Against
St. Kitts and Nevis Yes No Favor Against Abstain Abstain Abstain
Dominica Yes No Favor Against Against Against Against
St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines
Yes No Favor Against Against Against Against
Grenada Yes No Favor Favor Abstain Absent Against
Haiti Yes No Favor Against Abstain Favor Favor
Belize Yes No Favor Favor Favor Abstain Absent
Barbados No Yes Favor Favor Favor Abstain Abstain
Guyana Yes Yes Favor Favor Favor Favor Abstain
Bahamas Yes No Favor Favor Favor Favor Favor
Jamaica Yes No Favor Favor Favor Favor Favor
St. Lucia Yes No Favor Favor Favor Favor Favor
Source. Goldwyn and Gill (2016).a
Note. OAS = Organization of American States.
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supporters of Resolutions 2929, 1117, and 1124 have taken a 
position based on rationality. St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
and Dominica are two such examples; not only do Venezuela’s 
oil imports account to 6% of St. Vincent and the Grenadines’ 
GDP, but the Venezuelan government has also been a part of 
the coalition of the willing that has provided critical funding 
to the building of the first international airport (Argyle 
International) in St. Vincent and the Grenadines (IMF, 2007b; 
SELA, 2015). In the case of Dominica, Venezuela wrote off 
its PetroCaribe debt of US$100 million in 2017, in the after-
math of the devastation from Hurricane Maria (Dominica 
News Online, 2017). It can be argued that in comparison 
with Jamaica, PetroCaribe funding is more critical to the 
economies of Dominica and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. 
Jamaica has been able to gamble on its relationship with 
Venezuela, as it has the LNG and other investments as alter-
native energy supplies, both Dominica and St. Vincent and 
the Grenadines are not afforded that same opportunity. 
Perhaps it is for the aforementioned reason why both 
Dominica and St. Vincent and the Grenadines consistently 
support Venezuela’s interest in the OAS.
Unlike other CARICOM members which voted for or 
against the OAS Resolutions 2929, 1117, and 1124, the twin 
island republic of Trinidad and Tobago has consistently 
abstained from voting. Neither the Venezuelan PetroCaribe 
program nor the United States’ OPIC energy program is in 
Trinidad and Tobago’s national interest. Perhaps Trinidad and 
Tobago’s continuous abstention can be attributed to the fact 
that the United States is a major market for its LNG export. 
Furthermore, both Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela share 
a geographic border; it is in the interest of Trinidad and 
Tobago to have political and economic stability in Venezuela. 
This would most definitely reduce the flow of Venezuelan 
refugees into Trinidad and Tobago (Scruggs, 2018).
Conclusion
While historically the operations of the OAS have been pre-
dominantly explained by neoliberal institutionalism, in this 
most recent case of political instability in Venezuela, and the 
resulting divisions over OAS resolutions, neorealism is 
applicable. The discussion above suggests that the role of the 
OAS as a medium for states to negotiate their differences and 
find mutual agreements does not stop states with hegemonic 
intentions from at least attempting to influence the organiza-
tion’s agenda. Although neither the United States nor 
Venezuela has succeeded in dominating the agenda of the 
OAS, both have tried through the provision of incentives to 
indirectly influence the OAS process in their respective 
national interest.
Furthermore, the neorealist postulation that states are 
rational actors seeking to act in their self-interest provides 
grounds on which to examine the division among CARICOM 
members on selected OAS resolutions. As explained earlier, 
the voting process in the OAS among CARICOM members 
appears to be driven by rationality. Some members of the 
CARICOM bloc, which account for 15 of the 35 votes within 
the OAS, have received favorable economic incentives from 
both the United States and Venezuela and have cast their 
votes proportionate to incentives received. Where there are 
no or insufficient incentives from competing larger states, 
CARICOM states may see no reason to be moved by ratio-
nality and may very likely choose to abstain from voting.
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Notes
1. CARICOM members are Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, 
Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, 
St. Kitts-Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, 
Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, and the British colony, 
Montserrat.
2. CARICOM members: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, 
Belize, Dominica, Guyana, Grenada, Haiti, Jamaica, St. 
Kitts and Nevis, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines, St. 
Lucia, Suriname; Latin American members: Cuba, Dominica 
Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and 
Venezuela.
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